Double Shot Security and APNIC Training

Infrastructure and service provider security tutorial

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Introduction

Presenters

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Agenda

- Internet security status quo
- Identifying attackers hiding addresses and tracing miscreants
- Anatomy Botnets, DNS hijack and etc.
- APNIC whois database
- Digital forensics overview
- Attack detection techniques, forensic and mitigation tools for ISPs



Scope

- To provide wide and general information about current issues related to cyber attacks and forensics
- To enhance awareness of importance of network security and each organisation's responsibilities
- To provide a starting point for developing a forensic capability
- To provide above information from an IT point of view, not a law enforcement view

Outside of scope

- Each organisation operates under different law and regulations, it is NOT scope of this presentation:
 - to provide tangible guidelines
 - to execute a digital forensic investigation
 - -to provide legal advice
 - nor to provide a basis for investigations of criminal activities.
- Describing technical details of specific network forensics processes

Note

 Certain commercial organisations and their products and services may be mentioned in this module. However such identification does not imply recommendation or endorsement by APNIC nor organisations and authors that APNIC referred to develop this module.

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Acknowledgement

 This material refers many research outcomes provided by various organisations such as Arbor, Symatec and SANS Internet Storm Centre.

Internet security status quo

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The Storm Worm

- 15 Jan 2007, an innocuous looking email was sent to many computers in the world
- The subject line said "230 dead as storm batters Europe"
- <u>Actually, a big storm hit northern Europe at around the same time</u>
- The email contained a file attached with plausiblesounding name. Example for:
 - FullStory.exe
 - Read More.exe
- Trojan!
 - infecting something like a million computers worldwide
 - still out there
- The Trojan was distributed that opens up a back door that can be exploited later on

At that time, huge storms sweep northern Europe



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A marvel of social engineering

- "The storm is a marvel of social engineering."
- "Its subject line changes constantly."
 - "...constantly changing its size and tactics to evade virus filters..."
 - Its subject line appeals human nature
 - Shock "230 dead as storm batters Europe"
 - Outrage "A killer at 11, he's free at 21"
 - Prurience "Naked teens attack home director"
 - Romance "You asked me why"
 - Thus many people unconsciously allowed to invite the Trojan to their computer

Trojan + social engineering + organised crime

- The likely intention is to create many zombie computers:
 - To steal information
 - To further propagate large-scale spam and phishing runs
- "Trojan assaults of this scale are an unfortunate and increasingly common event. What is significant here though is the timely nature of this assault in relation to the European storm. Malware gangs are clearly using every technique and even tragedies like these to gain access to vulnerable machine"
 - By Mikko Hypponen, Chief Research Officer at F-Secure – among the first to detect the worm and named it as "The Storm Worm"

http://www.f-secure.com/f-secure/pressroom/news/fs news 20070119 1 eng.html

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Even a worm can have a conscience?

- It appears that bad guys been pulling their punches
- "We're lucky: so far they haven't gone in for more lucrative damaging activities like online gambling, stock scams and stealing passwords and credit-card information"

Time October 8, 2007 p48 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1666279,00.html

• The Internet security is in limbo situation with bad guys' mercy?

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Centre



Some research results

ARBOR Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report

Report by ARBOR

- Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report
 - Seventy self-classified Tier 1, Tier 2 and other IP network operators from North America, South America, Europe and Asia participated
 - Covering a 12 month period from July 2006 through July 2007
 - -Volume III, published in September 2007
 - Available from:
 - <u>http://www.arbornetworks.com/report</u>

Symantec Internet Security Threat Report

Some research results



Report by Symantec

- Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
 - -Trends for July December 07
 - -Volume XII, published April 2008
 - -Available from
 - <u>http://www.symantec.com/business/theme.jsp?them</u>
 <u>eid=threatreport</u>
 - Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
 - Trends for July December 07
 - Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report
 - Trends for July December 07

Identifying attackers

Identifying attackers

- Use Whois database
 - If you got a valid IP address of the attacker then you can use Whois database to track down the user of the address (theoretically)
 - -We will cover this topic later in more details
- Seek ISP's help
 - If attacks is caused by forged IP addresses, this may provide some help
- Research the history of the IP address
- Look for clues in application content

Identifying attackers


- Identifying the IP address used by the attackers is unfortunately often not so easy and simple with various reasons:
 - IP address spoofing
 - Attackers to create IP packets with a forged (spoofed) source IP address with the purpose of concealing the identify of the attacker (the sender) or impersonating another computing system (Ref: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP address spoofing)
 - Numerous source IP addresses used by an attacker
 - Attackers can use fake IP addresses
 - Attackers can use BOTNET attack to compromise many computers to launch DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attack
 - IP address can be assigned dynamically
 - Use of DHCP in networks
 - Private IP address + NAT (Network Address Translator)

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Hiding identities – example








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And some people help to hide IP addresses


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APNIC Whois Database

What does APNIC do?

Resource service


 IPv4, IPv6, ASNs Reverse DNS delegation Resource registration Authoritative registration server whois IRR 	 Facilitating the policy development process Implementing policy changes
 Information dissemination APNIC meetings Web and ftp site Publications, mailing lists 	<u>Training & Outreach</u> • Training • Internet Resource management • DNS workshops
Outreach seminars <u>http://www.apnic.net/community/lists/</u>	- Subsidised for members Schedule: http://www.apnic.net/training

Policy development

What is Whois Database?

- WHOIS is a TCP-based query/response protocol
 - widely used for querying a database in order to determine the custodian of a domain name, an IP address, or an autonomous system number on the Internet.
 - WHOIS lookups were traditionally made using a command line interface
 - Number of simplified web-based tools now exist for looking up
- The WHOIS system originated as a method that system administrators could use to look up information to contact other IP address or domain name administrators
 - almost like a white page

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• Mirroring is not necessarily bidirectional

- There are various private and public databases
 - ARIN, RIPE, AfriNIC, APNIC, LACNIC, JPNIC, ArcStar, RADB, CW, Optus, Telstra,
- Some of them mirror other databases

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
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Public database

- Public network management database
 - Operated by Internet Registries
 - E.g., APNIC Whois database
 - Public data only
 - Not private data, i.e., customers' assignment data
 - We will discuss this topic later

Tracks network resources

- IP addresses, ASNs, Reverse Domains, Routing policies
- Records administrative information
 - Contact information (persons/roles)
 - -Authorisation



Database object types

OBJECT	PURPOSE
person	Contact person
role	Contact group/roles
inetnum	IPv4 address custodianship
inet6num	IPv6 address custodianship
aut-num	Autonomous System Number
domain	Reverse domain
route	Prefix being announced
mntner	(maintainer) Provide data protection

http://www.apnic.net/db/





How to use APNIC Whois database?

Whois database query - clients

Standard Whois client

- Included with many Unix distributions
- RIPE extended Whois client
 - http://ftp.apnic.net/apnic/dbase/tools/ripe-dbase-client.tar.gz
- Query via the APNIC website
 - http://www.apnic.net/apnic-bin/whois2.pl
- Query clients MS-Windows etc.
 - Command line query clients, E.g.,
 - <u>http://gnuwin32.sourceforge.net/packages/jwhois.htm</u>
 - Web interface
 - Many available (you can easily find them via searching the web)

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Why use the whois database?

Register use of Internet Resources

- Reverse DNS, IP assignments (public data), etc.
- -Ascertain custodianship of a resource
- Fulfill responsibilities as resource holder
- Obtain details of technical contacts for a network
 - Investigate security incidents
 - Track source of network abuse or "spam" email

Basic whois database queries


- Unix
 - -whois -h whois.apnic.net <lookup key>
- Web interface

- http://www.apnic.net/apnic-bin/whois2.pl

- Look-up keys
 - -usually the object name
 - Check template for look-up keys

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APNIC Whois web query



APNIC Whois web query - example

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
APNIC Whois web query - example

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You're here:	lome » <mark>Database</mark>		Quick Links
Query the	APNIC Whois Database		
Need help			
 General 	earch help		
	king spam and hacking		
 To assis 	you with debugging problems, this whois qu	iery was received from IP Address []. Your web	client may be behind a web proxy.
% [whois.a	onic.net node-1]		
		ww.apnic.net/db/dbcopyright.html	
inetnum:	202.12.28.0 - 202.12.29.255	5	
netname:	APNIC-AP		
descr:	Asia Pacific Network Inform	nation Center, Pty. Ltd.	
descr:	Level 1 - 33 Park Road.		
descr:	Milton QLD 4064		
descr:	Australia		
country:	AU		
admin-c:	AIC1-AP		
tech-c:	NO4-AP		
	APNIC-HM		
mnt-by:	technical@apnic.net 1998091	18	
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country:	TH	
admin-c:	TK38-AP	Inetnum object
tech-c:	SK79-AP	
mnt-by:	APNIC-HM .	
mnt-lower:	MAINT-TH-THIX-CAT	
remarks:	Aggregated block of /18 from smaller blocks.	
changed:	hostmaster@apnic.net 20000320	
changed:	hm-changed@apnic.net 20030317	
status:	ALLOCATED PORTABLE	
source:	APNIC	
person:	Tanussit Klaimongkol	
address:	Data Comm. Dept. (Internet)	
address:	CAT Bangkok 10501	
address:	Thailand	
country:	ТН	
phone:	+66-2-2374300	
fax-no:	+66-2-5063186	
e-mail:	ktanus@cat.net.th	
nic-hdl:	TK38-AP	
mnt-by:	MAINT-TH-THIX-CAT	
changed:	ktanus@cat.net.th 20000215	
source:	APNIC	
person:	Serthsiri Khantawisoote	
address:	Data Communication Department, CAT	
address:	Bangkok 10501	
country:	TH	
phone:	+66-2-237-4300	
fax-no:	+66-2-506-3186	
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
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
Why private data?

- Customer privacy issues
 - Concerns about publication of customer information
 - Increasing government concern
- APNIC legal risk
 - Legal responsibility for accuracy and advice
 - Damages incurred by maintaining inaccurate personal data
- Customer data is hard to maintain
 - APNIC has no direct control over accuracy of data
 - Freshness of data is up to custodian's update
- Customer assignment registration is still mandatory within APNIC policies




Who can query private data?


- APNIC provides an ISP portal site, MyAPNIC
- APNIC members can query their own account through MyPANIC



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How it works





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Behind the Internet Storm Center		
The ISC relies on an all-volunteer effort to detect problems, analyze the threat echnical as well as procedural information to the general public. Thousands of most firewalls, intrusion detection systems, home broadband devices, and near are constantly collecting information about unwanted traffic arriving from the I eed the DShield database where human volunteers as well as machines pour t for abnormal trends and behavior. The resulting analysis is posted to the ISC's	sensors that work with ly all operating systems nternet. These devices hrough the data looking main web page where it	
can be automatically retrieved by simple scripts or can be viewed in near real to in many ways, the ISC parallels the data collection, analysis, and warning syste orecasters. For example, the National Weather Service uses small sensors in a to report pressure, wind speed, precipitation and other data electronically to re These local stations provide technical support to maintain the sensors, and the sensor data and display it for local meteorologists. They also forward the summ weather center or transnational weather analysis centers. If analysts are availan they can provide early warnings of storms in their areas. The national and trans analysis centers summarize and map all the regional data to provide an overall They monitor the data constantly looking for early evidence of major storms ar warnings whenever possible.	em used by weather s many places as possible gional weather stations. y summarize and map the parized data to national able to monitor the data, snational weather picture of the weather.	
ikewise, the Internet Storm Center uses small software tools to send intrusion ogs (after removing identifying information) to the DShield distributed intrusion SC's volunteer incident handlers monitor the constantly changing database to he community of major new security threats. The ISC also provides feedback t	on detection system. The provide early warnings to	

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
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Early Warning		
In addition to hundreds of users who monitor the ISC's website and provid warnings, the ISC is supported by a core team of expert volunteer inciden organization composed of the top tier of intrusion detection analysts from	nt handlers, making it a virtual	
The all-volunteer team monitors the data flowing into the database using graphical visualization tools and searches for activity that corresponds wit report their findings to the Internet community through the ISC main we general postings and emails to newsgroups or public information sharing f	th broad based attacks. They b site, directly to ISPs, and via	
The team determines whether a possible attack is real and whether it is with the team can request an immediate email to the 100,000 subscribers to the Consensus - an alerting service used primarily by very advanced security- network administrators and analysts. The email would ask for data and co evidence of the attack.	he SANS Security Alert - conscious system and	
Once the attack is fully understood, the team determines the level of prio whether to make a general announcement or simply post it, and whether providers involved so they may consider cutting off traffic to and from site attacks.	to get core Internet backbone	
The ISC maintains a private web site and private reports for each reportin the most recent attacks along with the indications of how many other site the severity of each attack, and background data about why attackers tar bage helps the reporting site manage its intrusion data and keeps track of	es the attackers have targeted, get specific ports. The web	

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Participating with the Internet Storm Center		*
The ISC uses the DShield distributed intrusion detection system for data collection collects data about malicious activity from across the Internet. This data is catalog and can be used to discover trends in activity, confirm widespread attacks, or assi firewall rules.	ged and summarized	
Currently the system is tailored to process outputs of simple packet filters. As fire produce easy to parse packet filter logs are now available for most operating syste submitted and used without much effort.		
DShield is a free service sponsored by the SANS Institute for the benefit of all Interparticipants may sign up for DShield at http://www.dshield.org/signup.html	ernet users.	
You do not <i>have</i> to register up in order to submit firewall logs to DShield. You can anonymously. But there are benefits to registering. Registered users can	submit logs	
 view the firewall logs they submitted to the DShield database (for the last 30) get a confirmation of their own submissions emailed to them after every sub optionally enable Fightback. DShield will forward selected authenticated su implicated when we detect that you have been attacked. Registered users can Fightback abuse messages that have been sent on their behalf. 	omission. bmissions to the ISP	E
Done	2001-4	+ 170:1f04:56::2 + 2 DWL: loading

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So if you are an ISP, what is your responsibility?

- You will be subject to the laws in the places where you operate
- You need to aware about such laws and keep necessary logs as defined in the law
- So check the legal situation in your own jurisdiction
- Update both public data and private data diligently
 - For your own record keeping purpose too
 - Protect them with the strongest authentication
 - Malicious attack can come from internally too

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Network forensics

Acknowledgement

- APNIC conducted extensive researches on the topic of network forensics to develop this module. APNIC appreciate to the following documents provided very useful input:
 - Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response: Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology
 - Published by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce: Available at
 - http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-86/SP800-86.pdf
 - Authored by Karen Kent, Suzanne Chevalier, Tim Grance and Hung Dang

Note

 Certain commercial organisations and their products and services may be mentioned in this module. However such identification does not imply recommendation or endorsement by APNIC nor organisations and authors that APNIC referred to develop this module.

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Overview

- Digital forensics (forensics) overview
- Forensics process
- Utilised data for forensics process
- Using data from network traffic

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Digital forensics overview

- Forensics science
 - -The application of science to the law
- Digital forensics (forensics)
 - Also know as
 - Computer and network forensics
 - Application of science to the
 - Identification of data
 - Collection of data
 - Examination of data
 - Analysis of data

Digital forensics overview

- Digital forensics techniques can be used for many purposes
 - Investigation crimes evidence collection for legal proceedings
 - Internal policy violations internal disciplinary actions
 - Reconstructing computer security
 - Troubleshooting operational problems including handling of malware incidents
 - Recovering from accidental system damage
- Without such capability, it will be difficult to determine:
 - What has happened?
 - What damages are incurred
 - Who did cause the problem?
 - How did it happen?
 - How to rectify the problem?
 - How to prevent the future incidents?

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Process of digital forensics

- Collection
 - Identifying, labelling, recording, and acquiring data from the possible sources while preserving data integrity
 - Examination
 - Processing collected data forensically, and assessing and extracting data of particular interest while preserving data integrity
- Analysis
 - Analysing the results of examination, using legally justifiable methods and techniques
- Reporting
 - Reporting the results of the analysis, providing recommendations for improvement of policies, procedures, tools, and other aspects of forensic process

Collection of data

- Identifying possible data sources
 - Typically, desktop computers, servers, network storage devices, and laptops, PDAs, cell phones, digital cameras, digital recorders, audio players and etc.
 - Possible data sources located in other places
 - E.g., Network activity and application usage within an organisation
 - Information may be recorded by other organisations
 - E.g., ISPs

Collection of data

- Analysts should be:
 - mindful of the owner of each data source and the effect on collecting data
 - E.g., getting copies of ISP records typically requires a court order
 - aware of the organisation's polices and legal considerations regarding externally owned property at the organisation's facilities and locations outside the organisation's control
 - E.g., employee's personal laptop, a contractor's laptop
 - E.g., a computer at a telecommuter's home office

Collection of data

- Some useful methods to collect data
 - Keep audit records
 - E.g., Most OSs can be configured to audit and record certain types of events
 - Centralised logging
 - Certain systems and applications forward copies of their logs to secure central log servers
 - Security monitoring controls (E.g., intrusion detection software, anti-virus software, and spyware detection and removal utilities) can generate logs of attacks and intrusions
 - Monitoring of user behaviour
 - Keystroke monitoring
 - Be aware this is a violation of privacy unless users are advised through organisational policy and login banners
 - Employing such method should be discussed with legal advisors and documented clearly in the oranisation's policy

Acquiring the data

- Analyst should make a informed decision regarding the prioritisation of data source acquisition
 - Develop a plan to acquire the data
 - Consider likely value, volatility of data and amount of effort required
 - Acquire data
 - Cab be acquired through security tools, analysis tools, or other means
 - Can be acquired through forensic tools
 - Verify the integrity of the data
 - Important to prove that the data has not been tampered
 - Can use tools such as message digest

Acquiring the data

- A clear defined chain of custody should be followed to avoid allegations of mishandling or tampering of evidence
 - Keeping a log of every person who had physical custody of the evidence, documenting the actions performed on the evidence and time
 - Storing the evidence in a secure location
 - Making a copy of the evidence and performing examination and analysis using only the copied evidence
 - Verifying the integrity of the original and copied evidence



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Data sources

- Using data from data files
- Using data from Operating Systems
- Using data from network traffic
- Using data from applications
- Using data from multiple sources

Data sources

- Network forensics analysis relies on all of the layers
- Hardware layer (=Data link layer) provides information about physical components
- Other layers describe logical aspects
- An analyst can map an IP address (logical identifier at the IP layer) to the MAC address (Media Access Control) of a particular NIC (Network Interface Card = physical identifier at the physical layer)
 - An analyst can identify a host of interest
 - Identifying a host helps to identify most likely being used applications

Ref: Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response

TCP/IP overview

Application layer	Sends and receives data for particular applications such as Domain Name System (DNS), Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)
Transport layer	Provides connection-oriented or connectionless services for transporting application layer services between networks. E.g., Transport Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
Internet Protocol layer (= Network Layer)	Routes packets across networks. IP is the fundamental protocol of this layer. Other protocols are Internet Control Message protocol (ICMP) and Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) etc.
Hardware layer (=Data Link Layer)	Handles communications on the physical network components. Well known data link layer protocol is Ethernet.

Ker: Guide to integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response

TCP/IP overview

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Trar sport layer	Provides connection-oriented or connectionless services for transporting application layer services between networks. E.g., Transport Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
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Hardwar (=Data LMk Layer) header header namer data	Handles communications on the physical network components. Well known data link layer protocol is Ethernet.

TCP/IP overview

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
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Hardwar (=Data Link Layer)	Handles communications on the physical network components. Well known data link layer protocol is Ethernet. Ref: Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Respon


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IPv4 datagram header

VER HLEN 4 bits 4 bits	DS (TOS) 8 bits	Total length 16 bits	
Identification 16 bits		Flag S 3 bits	Fragmentation offset 13 bits
Time to live 8 bits	Protocol 8 bits	Header checksum 16 bits	
Source IP address			
Destination IP address			
Options			

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Network traffic data source

- Typically several types of information sources are available
 - -Firewalls and routers
 - Packet sniffers
 - Protocol analysers
 - -Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)
 - Security event management tools
 - -Network forensic analysis tools

Firewalls and routers

- Firewall and routers examine network traffic and permit or deny it based on a set of rules
- They can be configured to log traffic information. E.g.,
 - Date and time the packet was processed
 - The source and destination IP addresses
 - The transport layer protocol (e.g., TCP, UDP)
 - Basic protocol information (e.g., TCP or UDP port numbers, ICMP type and code)

Packet sniffers and protocol analysers

- Packet sniffers are designed to monitor network traffic by capturing packets
 - Typically used to capture a particular type of traffic for troubleshooting or investigative purposes
 - Place the NIC in promiscuous mode
 - NIC accepts all incoming packets that it sees, regardless of their intended destinations
 - An analysis can configure the sniffer with particular criteria (E.g., certain TCP ports, certain source or destination IP addresses)
- Most of packet sniffers are also protocol analysers
 - They can reassemble streams from individual packets and decode communications

Ref: Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response

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Intrusion Detection Systems

- Network IDSs perform:
 - -packet sniffing to identify suspicious activity
 - analyse network traffic to identify suspicious activity
 - record relevant information
- Typically records:
 - Traffic information: e.g., date and time, source and destination IP addresses, protocol, protocol related information
 - Application specific information: e.g., username, filename, command, status code
 - -Other information: possible intent of the activity

Ref: Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response

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Remote access

- Remote access servers:
 - Devices such as VPN (Virtual Private Network) gateways and modem servers that facilitate connections between networks
 - Typically record
 - the origin of each connection and
 - might also indicate user account authentication information for each session
 - If remote access server assigns an IP address to a remote user such information can be logged too
- Applications designed to provide remote accesses
 - E.g., SSH (Secure Shell), Telnet, terminal servers, and remote control software
 - Such applications can be configured to log basic information for each connections (e.g., source IP addresses and user accounts)

Ref: Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response

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Security Event Management Software

- Security Event Management (SEM) software:
 - Can increase accessibility of many sources of network traffic information through a single interface
 - Importing security event information from various network traffic-related security event data sources (e.g., IDS logs, firewall logs)
 - Correlating events among the sources
 - Identifying related events by matching IP addresses, timestamps, and other aspects

Network Forensic Analysis Tools

- Network Forensic Analysis Tools (NFAT):
 - Typically provide a combined functionalities of packet sniffers, protocol analysers, and SEM software in a single product
 - Their focuses are typically on collecting, examining, and analysing network traffic

Other sources

- Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol Servers (DHCP)
 - They may contain assignment logs including the MAC address, the IP address assigned to that MAC address, and the assignment time
- Network Monitoring Software
 - To observe network traffic and gather statics
 - E.g., the amount of bandwidth typically consumed by various protocols, payload size and the source and destination IP addresses and ports for each packets
- Client/Server applications
- Hosts' network configuration and connections
- Internet Service Provider (ISP) records
 - ISP may collect network traffic-related data as part of their normal operations
 - Usual ISP records often might be kept for days or hours based on their business procedures

Legal considerations

- Collecting network traffic has legal implications
 - Information with privacy or security implications
 - Passwords the contents of emails, users' access records etc.
 - Organisations should have polices in regards with the monitoring networks, handling collected information and data retention policy
 - E.g., warning banners to systems that indicate network monitoring
 - Data collection after certain incidents
 - Important to follow consistent processes and to document all actions performed
 - E.g., Data collections on a particular user should be initiated only after the successful completion of a formal request and approval process
 - Organisations should have policies
 - What types of monitoring can and can not be performed without approval
 - Procedures of the request and approval process
 - Preserve original logs

Legal considerations - ISPs

- Large number of ISPs may require a court order before providing any information related to suspicious network activities
 - Suspicious packets passed through their infrastructure
 - This helps to preserve privacy and reduces the burden on and liability of the ISPs
 - It also slows down investigative process
 - Traffic of an ongoing network-based attack can go through several ISPs
 - It is hard to trace its source

Preservation vs. retention

- ISP typically discard any log file that's no longer required for business reasons
 - Network monitoring, fraud prevention or billing disputes
- US law enforcement groups claim by the time they contact ISPs, customers records may have been deleted in the routine course of business
 - Industry representatives say that if police respond to incidents promptly it's difficult to imagine any investigations to be imperilled
- Unclear which data retention law is required

http://news.com.com/FBI+director+wants+ISPs+to+track+users/2100-7348_3-6126877.html, accessed on 07/09/2007

Does police contact APNIC?

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Does police contact APNIC?

- Sometimes polices contact APNIC as a part of their computer crime investigation
- Sometimes polices visit the APNIC's office from various parts of the world to investigate details of a specific network

What information can APNIC provide?

- Public data in the APNIC Whois DB is publicly available
 - Anyone knowing how to query can conduct network search
 - The police have as much right to search it as anyone else
 - -APNIC can provide some advice to the police
 - How the Whois DB works?
 - What the various fields mean?
 - How best to search it?

But remember...

- Information accuracy and freshness is up to organisations which are custodians of each address block
- Most likely no customer assignment details can be found on the public database
 - Only the ISP who assign the IP address to their customers can see details

Information on direct allocation and assignment made by APNIC

- If a custodian of an address block directly allocated or assigned by APNIC is investigated
 - APNIC may be asked to provide more detailed information than the public Whois DB such as billing details or other contact information
 - In such case, generally a court order or warrant will be required as APNIC has nondisclosure agreement with its members
 - Remember, APNIC only knows about the address registered in the Whois DB.
 - APNIC has no information about who is actually using the address

Specific network traffic information

- APNIC does not have any information about network traffic information
 - -Who used which IP address at what time
 - Such information, usually only available through logs held by the ISP, if they have not deleted them yet
- If the police is looking for such information, APNIC suggests them to contact the ISP

Thank you!