Community tools to fight against DDoS

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 1.3



DDoS

- Denial of Service (DoS) / Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is the act of
 - performing an attack which prevents the system from providing services to legitimate users
- Denial of Service attacks take many forms, and utilize many attack vectors
- Used to cover up other attack vectors





Types of Attacks

- Volume Based Attacks
- Application Layer Attacks



http://thehackernews.com/2016/01/biggest-ddos-attack.html

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Application-layer DDoS attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated





Addressing DDoS attacks

- Preparation
 - Deploy necessary tools and grab list
- Detection
 - Detect incoming fake requests
- Mitigation
 - Diversion : Send traffic to a specialized device that removes the fake packets from the traffic stream while retaining the legitimate packets
 - Return : Send back the clean traffic to the server





3 Community tools

- Bogon Filter
 - https://www.team-cymru.org/bogon-reference.html
- Flow Sonar
 - https://www.team-cymru.org/Flow-Sonar.html
- UTRS (Unwanted Traffic Removal Service)
 - <u>https://www.team-cymru.org/UTRS/index.html</u>





1. Bogon Filter





Bogon Filter

- A bogon prefix is a route that should never appear in the Internet routing table
 - Bogons are defined as Martians (private and reserved addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 5735, and RFC 6598) and netblocks that have not been allocated to a RIR by the IANA
- These are commonly found as the source addresses of DDoS attacks
- Study shows 60% of the naughty packets were obvious bogons
- Bogon and fullbogon lists are NOT static lists





Bogon Filter : Configuration IPv4

```
router bgp 17821
 neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx remote-as 65332
 neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx description CYMRUBOGONS
 neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx ebgp-multihop 255
 neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx password 7 070C134D575F0A5116
 neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx update-source Loopback0
 L.
 address-family ipv4
  neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx activate
  neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx soft-reconfiguration inbound
  neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx prefix-list CYMRU-OUT-V4 out
  neighbor 38.229.xxx.xxx route-map CYMRUBOGONS-V4 in
 !
!configure community list to accept the bogon prefixes into the route-map
ip community-list 100 permit 65332:17821
1
!configure route-map. Remember to apply it to the proper peering sessions.
route-map CYMRUBOGONS-V4 permit 10
 description IPv4 Filter bogons learned from cymru.com bogon route-servers
match community 100
 set ip next-hop 192.0.2.1
1
!set a bogon next-hop on all routers that receive the bogons
ip route 192.0.2.1 255.255.255.255 NullO
!
ip prefix-list CYMRU-OUT-V4 seq 5 deny 0.0.0.0/0 le 32
```

Bogon Filter : Configuration IPv6

```
router bgp 17821
 neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx remote-as 65332
 neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx description CYMRUBOGONS
 neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:ebgp-multihop 255
 neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx password 7 0458390716775F1A08
 neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx update-source Loopback0
 L.
 address-family ipv6
  neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx activate
  neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxx soft-reconfiguration inbound
  neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxx prefix-list CYMRU-OUT-V6 out
  neighbor 2620:0:6B0::xxxx:xxxx route-map CYMRUBOGONS-V6 in
!
!configure community list to accept the bogon prefixes into the route-map
ip community-list 100 permit 65332:17821
1
!configure route-map. Remember to apply it to the proper peering sessions.
route-map CYMRUBOGONS-V6 permit 10
 description IPv6 Filter bogons learned from cymru.com bogon route-servers
match community 100
 set ipv6 next-hop 2001:DB8:0:DEAD:BEEF::1
1
!set a bogon next-hop on all routers that receive the bogons
ipv6 route 2001:DB8:0:DEAD:BEEF::1/128 Null0
!
ipv6 prefix-list CYMRU-OUT-V6 seq 5 deny ::/0 le 128
```

Bogon Filter : Output

```
APNIC-Training-Lab01#show ip bgp 31.22.8.0/21
BGP routing table entry for 31.22.8.0/21, version 175332535
Paths: (1 available, best #1, table default, not advertised
to EBGP peer)
Advertised to update-groups:
    1
Refresh Epoch 1
65332, (received & used)
    192.0.2.1 from 38.229.66.20 (38.229.66.20)
    Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, external, best
    Community: 65332:17821 no-export
    rx pathid: 0, tx pathid: 0x0
```



Bogon Filter : Status

The IPv4 fullbogons list is approximately 3,714 prefixes.
 – [date : 26th January, 2016]

Neighbor V	AS MsgRo	cvd MsgSent	TblVer	InQ OutQ
Up/Down State/PfxRcd				
38.229.xxx.xxx 4	65332	12017 12017	1860723	91 0
0 1w0d 3733				

The IPv6 fullbogons list is approximately 65,788 prefixes.
 – [date : 26th January, 2016]

Neighbor	v v	AS	MsgRcvd	MsgSent	TblVer	InQ (OutQ
Up/Down	State/PfxRcd						
2404:A80	0:xxxx:xx::xxxx						
	4	9498	3239994	72131	40075514	0	0
3w1d	65788						





Bogon Filter : Peering

- Contact bogonrs@cymru.com
 - 1. Which bogon types you wish to receive (traditional IPv4 bogons, IPv4 fullbogons, and/or IPv6 fullbogons)
 - 2. Your AS number
 - 3. The IP address(es) you want us to peer with
 - 4. Does your equipment support MD5 passwords for BGP sessions?
 - 5. Optional: your GPG/PGP public key
- <u>https://www.team-cymru.org/bogon-reference-bgp.html</u>





2. Flow Sonar





Flow Sonar

- The Team Cymru Flow Sonar system is a powerful tool for network managers to visually identify and understand what is happening on their network at any given time
- Leveraging the free and open-source framework provided by Peter Haag of SWITCH
- Special plugins "dosrannu" developed by Team Cymru to track malicious activity on your network
- Unique dosrannu feeds alerted to DDoS attacks, compromised machines, and the presence of connections to C&C hosts





Flow Sonar

Home	Granhe	Dotaile	Alorte	State	Dlugine	live	Bookmark URL	Profile	

AGERC

ACCR0

Flow Stats

icmp trend is 99.87% (down) | tcp trend is 95.71% (down) | udp trend is 97.85% (down)

1	logroup)		2015-04-09 20:35:00	164673	5 99
	Packets/s: Wed Apr: 8 20.40 00 2015 - Thu Apr: 9 20.40:00 2015 3 0 M f	Bits/s: 1Ned Apr / 8 20:40:00 2015 - Thu Apr / 9 20:40:00 2015	2015-04-09 20:30:00	166139	3 99
	300 28 M 26 M	200 186 166	2015-04-09 20:25:00	167651	1 97
	224 225 200 160	100 a 126	2015-04-09 20:20:00	172481	3 10
	16M 14N	100 86	2015-04-09 20:15:00	171707	3 10
	129 109 889 849	66 46	2015-04-09 20:10:00	163911	1 98
	4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	Burliel Burliel <t< td=""><td>Latest Flow Alerts</td><td></td><td></td></t<>	Latest Flow Alerts		
		106 106	timestamp	count	src ip
			2015-04-09 20:55:01	4	*202.
	SAN SAN 22H M Sat San Han Tar Bed Thu	Man Aur A A A	2015-04-09 20:55:01	4	*116.19
	AGCR02	AGGRDD	2015-04-09 20:55:01	8	103.243
	Packets/c: Tue Mar 10 20:40 00 2015 - Thu Apr 9 20:40:00 2015 30 M *	Bits/s: Tue Mar 10 20:40:00 2015 - Thu Apr 9 20:40:00 2015 200 *	2015-04-09 20:55:01	4	113.107
	144	180			100 44

Overview Profile: live, Group: (nogroup)

Flows/s: Wed Apr 8 20:40:00 2015 - Thu Apr 9 20:40:00 2015


Flows/s: Thu Apr. 2 20:40:00 2015 - Thu Apr. 9 20:40:00 2015

Flows/s: Tue Mar 10 20:40:30 2015 - Thu Apr : 9 20:40:00 2015

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240 k 220 k 200 k 100 k

AGCR30



icmp flows icmp % diff tcp flows tcp % diff udp flows udp % diff timestamp 2262785 97.83% .1% 0287852 95.49% 2534361 94.89% 2% 42190036 94.08% 3209615 96.85% 0.459 96.22% 9.02% 363983 6606550 99.78% 3775167 102.24% 4.769670874 6.29%

timestamp	count	src ip	src port	dst ip	dst port	protocol	alert source	type
2015-04-09 20:55:01	4	*202.59.132.4	33356	113.107.239.158	8080	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	4	*116.193.217.35	8080	100.43.160.132	1425	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	8	103.243.222.100	80	*116.193.217.35	60689	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	4	113.107.239.163	8081	*202.59.132.4	49278	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	4	183.61.179.151	8081	*202.59.132.4	46173	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	4	100.43.169.4	3619	*116.193.217.35	8080	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	8	61.160.207.170	55142	*202.59.132.4	8080	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	4	100.43.132.148	2076	*116.193.217.35	8080	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	4	*116.193.217.35	8080	100.43.161.12	1079	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	4	*116.193.217.35	58642	61.57.227.181	80	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	4	*116.68.199.110	36293	122.225.38.197	81	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	4	*116.193.217.35	8080	79.141.173.52	51093	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	4	60.169.77.106	62030	*115.127.26.1	8080	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	28	*202.191.122.250	8080	222.186.26.34	13109	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	12	61.160.207.204	16502	*115.127.26.3	8080	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	8	61.160.6.105	16991	*202.59.132.4	8080	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	8	*202.59.132.4	8080	60.169.77.116	16040	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	4	*202.59.132.4	8080	222.186.26.34	58493	6	ip reputation	proxy
2015-04-09 20:55:01	4	120.195.155.69	801	*202.59.132.4	48362	6	ip reputation	proxy



Flow Sonar : Get It

- Contact outreach@cymru.com
 - 1. Team Cymru will send hardware
 - 1 Server
 - 1 Router
- <u>https://www.team-cymru.org/Flow-Sonar.html</u>






3. UTRS (Unwanted Traffic Removal Service)
































RTBH Upstream

- Check whether your upsteam provider support RTBH
- Configure & Test RTBH before incident
- Only announce IPv4 /32's from address space you originate or your customer





UTRS

- It's based on the basic principle of DDoS filtering; Remotely Triggered Black Hole Filtering
- UTRS is a system that helps mitigate large infrastructure attacks by leveraging:
 - an existing network of cooperating BGP speakers such as ISPs, hosting providers and educational institutions
 - that automatically distributes verified BGP-based filter rules from victim to cooperating networks





UTRS : Configuration

```
router bgp 17821
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx remote-as 64496
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx description CYMRUBOGONS-UTRS
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx ebgp-multihop 255
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx transport connection-mode passive
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx password 7 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx update-source Loopback0
address-family ipv4
  neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx activate
 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx send-community
 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx soft-reconfiguration inbound
 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx route-map UTRS-OUT out
 neighbor 154.35.xxx.xxx route-map UTRS-IN in
1
access-list 1 remark utility ACL to deny everything
access-list 1 deny any
1
ip prefix-list 32-only permit 0.0.0.0/0 ge 32
ip community-list standard RTBH permit 17821:0
1
route-map UTRS-IN permit 10
  match ip address prefix-list 32-only
route-map UTRS-IN deny 100
  match ip address 1
1
                                               ip route 203.176.189.10 255.255.255.255 null0
route-map UTRS-OUT permit 10
  match ip address prefix-list 32-only
  match community RTBH
route-map UTRS-OUT deny 100
  match ip address 1
```

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UTRS : Apply

- Newly launched service
 - Quite picky to choose whom to peer
 - Do organization verification
- <u>https://www.team-cymru.org/UTRS/index.html</u>
- FAQ:
 - <u>https://www.cymru.com/jtk/misc/utrs.html</u>





How UTRS varies from RTBH with upstream!

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


Other Efforts

- NANOG BCOP : DDoS-DoS-attack-BCOP
 - <u>http://bcop.nanog.org/index.php/DDoS-DoS-attack-BCOP</u>
- Routing Resilience Manifesto
 - Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS)
 - https://www.routingmanifesto.org/manrs/











Questions!



